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Abstract 
While foreign direct investment (FDI) is widely believed to have an adverse effect on the bargaining power of unions 
and hence on union wages, little empirical research has been done to substantiate this conjecture. The present paper 
aims at filling this gap by analysing the effect of foreign ownership on the union wage premium in Denmark. Using 
matched employer-employee data, the positive effect of plant level unionisation on wages is found to vanish in foreign-
owned firm.
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades or so foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased sharply, both in 
absolute  terms  but  also  relative  to  GDP  and  trade.  While  FDI  is  often  perceived  to  be 
beneficial to the host country, trade unions frequently fight foreign take-overs. A commonly 
expressed concern in that respect is that globalization in general and FDI in particular will 
erode the bargaining power of workers forcing them to accept lower wages. In fact, while 
there is now a sizeable theoretical literature that generally confirms these concerns, empirical 
evidence on the issue is virtually nonexistent.
1  
The present paper aims at filling this gap by providing an empirical assessment of the 
effects  of  foreign  ownership  on  the  union  wage  premium  in  Denmark.  The  institutional 
framework in Denmark shares two features that allow me to study the question at hand. First, 
unions have a strong influence on the wage setting process in Denmark.
2 Second, to a large 
degree collective bargaining in Denmark takes place at the plant-level (cf. OECD, 2004). 
Hence,  one  can  expect  plant-level  characteristics  to  play  an  important  role  in  wage 
settlements.  
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The  study  utilises  data  from  the  Integrated  Data  Base  (IDA)  for  Labor  Market  Research 
combined  with  firm-level  information  both  compiled  by  Statistics  Denmark.  Based  on 
administrative registers the data covers the total Danish population for the years 2000 to 
2002.  IDA  provides  a  large  number  of  individual  socio-economic  characteristics,  and  in 
particular information on trade union membership. The dependent variable of the regression 
analysis  is  (the  log  of)  the  nominal  hourly  wage  rate  which  is  calculated  by  Statistics 
Denmark.  
Each individual can be linked to a workplace which in turn is matched with firm-level 
information. A firm is classified as being foreign-owned when more than 50% of the firm is 
owned  by  foreigners.  Moreover,  the  FDI  has  to  amount  to  more  than  DKK  10  million. 
Therefore, the definition may fail to identify small foreign-owned firms.
3 The nature of the 
dataset also enables users to calculate average characteristics of the workers employed in a 
firm.  Most  importantly,  union  density  at  the  firm-level  is  computed  as  the  fraction  of 
employees that are members of a trade union.  
For the analysis, attention is confined to full-time private sector employees aged 18 - 65, 
for which the wage information was classified as being reliable. The sample then consists of 
2169277 observations. 
                                                 
1 A number of studies discuss the wage effects of multinational enterprises in unionised labour markets and 
show that a credible threat to shift production abroad improves the bargaining position of a firm (cf. Mezzetti 
and Dinopoulos, 1991, for an early contribution). In contrast, to the best of my knowledge, Choi (2001) is the 
only study that comes up with evidence on the threat effect of FDI. Using industry-level panel data he shows 
that the union wage premium in US manufacturing is negatively associated with the stock of outward FDI. 
2 The high degree of unionisation in Denmark may induce spill-over effects from wage agreements in unionised 
firms to non-unionised firms. The union wage premium is then likely to be rather small. 
3 As a robustness check, I have therefore restricted the sample to firms with at least 35 employees. Qualitative 
results remain largely unchanged. Another potential problem is the fact that Danish multinational enterprises, 
which may have a bargaining position comparable to foreign-owned firms, can not be identified. Hence, any 
established negative effect of foreign ownership on union wages might be considered as a lower bound on the 
corresponding effect of multinationals on union wages. 2 
In line with previous empirical evidence
4, Table 1 shows that on average workers earn 
considerably  higher  wages  when  employed  in  a  firm  owned  by  foreigners.  The  average 
hourly wage in foreign-owned firms is 13.4% higher than in Danish firms. Both in foreign-
owned and in Danish firms at about 83% of all individuals in the dataset are members of a 
trade union. 
Next, descriptive statistics are provided separately for members of a trade union and for 
employees working in a firm with a union density of 75% or above. High-skilled workers are 
underrepresented  among  union  members.  This may  partly  explain  why  on  average  union 
members earn slightly lower wages than non-members. The descriptive statistics also show 
that the foreign ownership premium is much lower for union members and for workers in 
highly unionised enterprises.  For the latter the premium shrinks to merely 7.7%. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics at the firm level and shows that Danish and foreign 
firms  differ  systematically  from  each  other.  In  particular,  foreign-owned  enterprises  are 
larger, more capital-intensive and export more than their Danish counterparts. Table 2 also 
documents that highly unionised firms tend to be somewhat larger than firms with a lower 
share of trade union members.  
 
3. Empirical Specification 
 
I estimate the following wage equation for individual i working in firm j at time t  
 
ln ijt it jt it jt jt it jt jt jt t i j ijt w X Z UM UD F UM F UD F α β δ φ γ µ ρ λ α θ ε = + + + + + + + + + + .   (1) 
 
The dependent variable, ln wijt, is the gross hourly wage. Xit is a vector of observed individual 
characteristics including age (squared), tenure (squared), actual work experience (squared), 
dummies for educational attainment and small children in the household, and a full set of 
occupational  and  regional  dummies.  Zjt  contains  firm  characteristics,  namely  the  capital-
labour ratio, the share of exports in total sales, the logarithm of the number of full-time 
equivalent  employees  in  the  firm,  industry  dummies,  and  average  characteristics  of  the 
workforce. 
In order to assess the influence of trade unions on individual wages, a dummy variable for 
individual union membership (UMit) and four dummy variables,
5 each  with a 20% band, 
indicating the union density (UDjt) of enterprise j are included (a density of between 40 and 
60 % serves as the reference category). High degrees of unionisation can be expected to 
improve the bargaining situation of unions through its impact on the ability of workers to 
inflict a loss on the firm during a labour dispute (Barth et al., 2000). Union membership 
differentials  are  also  widely  documented  in  the  literature  but  open  to  a  number  of 
interpretations.
6 In fact, some studies find the membership premium to vanish once union 





                                                 
4 A large literature documents a positive wage premium in foreign-owned firms even though recent evidence 
based on matched employee-employer data suggests that the premium is lower than previously thought (see e.g. 
Heyman et al., 2008).  
5 A linear union density term was also tested. The qualitative results do not change materially. Since I do find 
nonlinearities in the effect of union density on wages, attention is restricted to dummy specifications.  
6 A possible explanation for a positive union membership premium is preferential treatment of unions members 
with respect to promotions. See Barth et al. (2000) for an overview. 3 
 
Table 1: Selected descriptive statistics at the individual level 
 
  All workers  Union members  Working in firms with 
high union density  
(> 75 %) 
Firm 
ownership 
Foreign  Danish  Foreign  Danish  Foreign  Danish 
hourly wage 
(DKK)  212.7  187.5  204.3  183.1  197.9  183.7 
union member  .8299  .8321  1.000  1.000  .8953  .9119 
Skill level 
  low   .2608  .2767  .2883  .2951  .3034  .2998 
  medium  .5729  .6071  .5802  .6112  .5750  .6062 
  high  .1663  .1162  .1314  .0937  .1216  .0940 
N  331247  1838030  274907  1529418  255743  1445665 
 
Table 2: Selected descriptive statistics at the firm level 
 
  All firms  Firms with high union density  
(> 75 %) 
Firm ownership  Foreign  Danish  Foreign  Danish 
General characteristics 
export  .2482  .0620  .2783  .0581 
firm size  82.56  15.56  102.6  18.95 
capital/labour  5454  906.0  1160  906.3 
N  6281  191992  3625  119442 
 
The dummy Fjt indicates whether a firm is owned by foreigners. The union variables are 
interacted with the foreign ownership dummy to study the central question of this paper, 
namely whether the influence of trade unions on wages differ between foreign and Danish 
firms. The theoretical literature on the wage effects of multinational enterprises in unionised 
labour markets predicts that the bargaining strength of a union deteriorates in foreign-owned 
firms. Accordingly, the interaction between union density, i.e. the fraction of employees in a 
firm that are members of a trade union, and foreign ownership can be expected to enter the 
regression equation with a negative sign. Since the theoretical literature focuses on the overall 
bargaining  strength  of  a  firm-level  union  and  does  not  consider  the  individual  union 
membership wage premium, existing studies do not offer a prediction on the sign of the 
interaction between union membership and foreign ownership. 
Finally, αi, λt, and θj are fixed individual-, time- and firm-effects, respectively, and εijt is 
the error term. 
Provided that unobserved specific effects are uncorrelated with the variables of interest, 
consistent estimates could be obtained by pooling the data and estimating the model by OLS. 
However,  union  membership  but  also  union  density  are  likely  to  be  correlated  with 
unobservable individual-specific characteristics that affect the wage rate (cf. Lewis, 1986). 
Hence, fixed effect estimation is used to remove unobservable (time-invariant) individual 
specific heterogeneity. 
Estimates  could  still  be  confounded  by  unobserved  firm-specific  heterogeneity.  In 
particular, foreign-owned firms might exhibit unobserved characteristics that systematically 
differ from domestic firms and affect individual wages. Both firm- and individual-specific 
heterogeneity  can  be  eliminated  by  defining  worker-firm  combinations  (‘spells’)  and 4 
estimating a spell fixed effects model. Note that identification then hinges solely on within-
establishment  variation.  For  instance,  the  foreign  ownership  premium  is  only  identified 
through changes of the ownership status of a given firm. Consequently, in a short panel the 
spell fixed effects regression is only able to detect the immediate wage effects of foreign 
take-overs. 
Standard errors are adjusted by clustering on the firm-level (cf. Moulton, 1990). 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Table 3 presents the results of an individual fixed effects regression of the log hourly wage on 
foreign ownership, the union variables and interactions between the two. Foreign ownership 
enters positively and is highly statistically significant with a point estimate of .0402. The 
coefficient estimates of the union density dummies are statistically significant and increasing 
in size. Workers in highly unionised firms (union density of 80 to 100%) are found to earn 
almost 5% higher wages than employees in firms with no or little union presence. However, 
taking into account the interaction terms between union density and foreign ownership, the 
influence of union density on wages vanishes in foreign-owned firms. Nevertheless, even in 
highly unionised firms workers still benefit from foreign owners. However, for these workers 
the foreign ownership wage premium shrinks to merely 1.09%
7 and is hence much smaller 
than for employees in firms with little or no union presence. 
In specifications (2) and (3) I add individual and firm characteristics to the baseline 
equation. While the qualitative results remain largely unchanged, coefficient estimates are 
markedly smaller. Workers in highly unionised firms are now found to earn between 2.30% 
and  3.31%  more  than  their  colleagues  in  firms  with  no  or  little  union  presence.  The 
interaction terms have the expected signs but are only statistically significant for firms with a 
large proportion of union members. This suggests that in foreign-owned firms union density 
has only a positive wage effect at small to medium levels. Consequently, the overall foreign 
ownership premium declines in highly unionised enterprises. While the premium amounts to 
between 2.16% and 2.47% for firms in the lowest union density band, the estimate shrinks to 
a value of between 0.74% and 1.10% in highly unionised enterprises. 
The spell fixed effects model (column 4) is consistent with previous specifications in 
terms  of  the  estimated  signs  of  the  union  density  dummies  and  the  interaction  terms. 
However,  estimates  are  largely  statistically  insignificant  and  no  evidence  for  a  foreign 
ownership premium is found. This may point to important unobserved firm-specific effects. 
However, with respect to the union density estimates this seems unlikely, since all relevant 
firm characteristics identified in the literature (cf. Andrews et al., 1998) are controlled for in 
specification (3). Given that identification relies solely on within-establishment variation, the 
result could simply be due to the fact that an increase in union density may not affect wages 
in the very short run. Unfortunately, with the data at hand the issue can not be conclusively 
resolved since a more thorough treatment would require a sufficient number of before- and 







                                                 






Table 3: Fixed effects estimation results 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
























































































Individual characteristics  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm characteristics  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Spell fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes 
R² (within)  .0023  .0881  .0920  .1059 
N  2169277  2169277  2169277  2169277 
***, 
**,
* statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. Standard errors, 
reported in brackets, were calculated with clustering by firms. Year dummies included in 
all but the baseline regression (1). Reference Category: Non-union member in Danish firm 
with a union density of between 0.4 and 0.6. 
 
With respect to the effect of union membership on wages and its interaction with 
foreign ownership, the results are stable  across  specifications.  Leaving  aside the baseline 
regression,  union  membership  has  a  small  but  statistically  significant  positive  impact  on 
wages. The membership in a trade union is estimated to increase wages by between 0.57% 
and 0.67% and the membership premium does not differ between workers in foreign-owned 




The  paper  at  hand  has  presented  first  empirical  evidence  on  the  impact  of  foreign 
ownership on union wage effects. Confirming the theoretical prediction, we find the positive 
wage effect of plant-level unionisation in Denmark to largely vanish in foreign-owned firm. 
The result might help to understand why trade unions resist foreign take-overs even though 





Andrews, M.J., M.B. Stewart and J.K. Swaffield (1998) “The Estimation of Union Wage 
Differentials and the Impact of Methodological Choices” Labour Economics 5, 449-
474. 
Barth, E., O. Raaum and R. Naylor (2000) “Union Wage Effects: Does Membership Matter?” 
Manchester School 68, 259-75. 
Choi,  M.  (2001)  “Threat  Effect  of  Foreign  Direct  Investment  on  Labor  Union  Wage” 
Premium Working Papers wp27,  University of Massachusetts at Amherst. 
Heyman, F., Tingvall, P.K.,  Sjöholm, F. (2007) “Is there Really a Foreign Ownership Wage 
Premium?  Evidence  from  Matched  Employer-Employee  Data”  Journal  of 
International Economics 73, 355-376. 
Lewis, H.G. (1986) Union Relative Wage Effects: A Survey, Chicago University Press. 
Mezzetti, C. and E. Dinopoulos (1991) “Domestic Unionization and Import Competition” 
Journal of International Economics 31, 79-100. 
Moulton, B. R. (1990) “An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Effects of Aggregate 
Variables on Micro Unit” The Review of Economics and Statistics 72, 334-38. 
OECD (2004) Employment Outlook,  OECD: Paris. 